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dict, or negate, the prescribed design and function”. In our view, 
this focus on agency in production and use of technologies is in 
line with the objectives of participatory technology assessment 
(TA) and may become a conceptual resource for it.
Phil Mulins addressed the question of technological imagi-
naries of digitization, reconstructing Polanyi’s participation in 
the mind-machine debate since the late 1940s. His concept of 
personal and tacit knowledge confronted both Cartesian dual-
ism and reductionist theory of mind and underlay his scepticism 
about unlimited formalization, even though he acknowledged its 
indispensability for the complex modern societies. This makes 
Polanyi’s post-critical philosophy relevant for the current debate 
on digitization, including questions of algorithmic bias and dis-
crimination. Mulins formulated the task for TA nowadays: “So-
ciety needs both to set limits upon predictive analytics and to 
recognize better the potential of predictive analytics to promote 
the good society”.
Epistemology
Two talks touched on epistemological questions concerning neu-
ral networks. Paul Grünke used the development of the neural 
network based chess engine AlphaZero to illustrate the differ-
ent kinds of epistemic opacities, which are present in classi-
cal modeling and computer simulations compared to machine 
learning techniques. He claimed that the opacities in the tradi-
tional approaches are contingent, but machine learning intro-
duced a  fundamental kind of opacity. This model-opacity can 
make it impossible to trace the origin of specific results, be-
cause the underlying structure of the neural network cannot be 
understood.
Reto Gubelmann analyzed a claim made in the natural lan-
guage processing community: the results of new translation 
systems using “neural machine translation” cannot be distin-
guished from those of professional human translators. They re-
gard it as a clear step towards strong AI. Comparing this claim 
to Searle’s classical Chinese Room thought experiment, Gubel-
mann showed that the techniques used (semantic representations 
via word embedding) are more advanced than classical statis-
tical approaches and it could be argued that these systems do 
have some kind of linguistic understanding. Opacity of machine 
learning processes, however, limits our understanding of the ma-
chine’s understanding.
Political science and media studies
A few talks focused on ideological implications of digitization. 
Jernej Kaluza explored fragmentation and polarization of the 
digital environment, manifesting itself both in collective and in-
dividual social action: from the rise of alt-right politics to mass 
shootings. He claimed that “digital hate” cannot be explained in 
psychological terms, but is a mutual reinforcement of individual 
choices and algorithms of personalization, creating the “endless 
You-loops”, or a “static and narrowing version of oneself”. Mar-
ginalization of hate speech, he argued, has the backfire effect of 
creating even more radicalized “rabbit holes”.
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The Budapest Workshop on Philosophy of Technology, hosted 
by the Budapest University of Technology and Economics on 
the 12th and 13th of December 2019, drew around 50 scholars 
from philosophy, history, sociology and Science and Technology 
Studies. Many of the talks approached the topic of Artificial In-
telligence (AI) from socio-historical, epistemological or ethical 
perspective. Mark Coecklbergh gave the keynote speech and of-
fered a comprehensive overview of ethical issues and policy di-
rections concerning AI with a focus on Europe.
History and philosophy of technology
The philosophical legacy was revised with regard to current is-
sues, for example by two reports discussing the “empirical turn” 
of the 1980s from different comparative perspectives.
Agostino Cera described the “empirical turn” as “transition 
from an over-distance to an overproximity”. The new relativist 
and contextual approach to “technologies” (in the plural) con-
fronted essentialism, determinism and dystopianism of the “clas-
sics”, especially Heidegger. For Cera, this blurred the distinction 
between “problems” (requiring solutions) and “questions” (re-
maining open). “Engineerization of philosophy of technology” 
as problem-solving activity converged with scientific, technical 
or political expertise. Cera argued for leaving space for the gen-
uinely philosophical “Grundfrage”: the question of the histori-
cal or epochal phenomenon of technology as such.
For Darryl Cressman, the distinction between classical 
and empirical approaches is not relevant for critical philoso-
phy. Marxist thought, he claimed, was always empirically ori-
ented, recognizing the historical contingency of technology and 
disentangling reification of socio-economic interests in it. The 
“negative dialectics” reveals the inherent biases and reflects on 
alternatives, or “unrealized potential” of technology. This can be 
seen in the practices and imaginaries of users, which “contra-
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Jacopo Bodini linked the subjective experience with the total-
ity of digital culture. He claimed that hypothesis of the coming 
post-ideological era did not grasp recent metamorphosis of “ide-
ology”: from political or philosophical metanarrative to aestheti-
cization of its own technological base. Its major feature is “trans-
parency”, which paradoxically conceals itself. Subjectively, it 
means ignoring the technological mediation of experience. The 
logic of “immediation” can be seen in the rise of populism and 
fake news, but also in the immersive way of digital life, shaping 
(“in-forming”) individual perceptions and desires.
Ricardo Rohm investigated agency in opinion-making dur-
ing the political crisis in Brazil, describing it as “architecture of 
misinformation”. The interaction between “corporatocracy” and 
technocracy (IT-corporations and social platforms, advertisers 
and lobbies), he claimed, makes political marketing a real threat 
to representative democracy. The interplay of national and trans-
national actors reflects how through the globalization of politics 
civil society loses control at the national level. South American 
political systems are especially vulnerable, since their recent 
democratization evolves against the background of the digital 
revolution.
This discussion raises the further question for TA: what are 
the effective means of regulating the digital public sphere – both 
nationally and globally – for maintaining the argumentative and 
representative discourse?
Responsibility and decision-making
One of the salient topics during the whole conference was the 
question how to distribute accountability and responsibility of 
human actors, making decisions based on the suggestion of an 
automated expert system. A typical illustration: a doctor uses 
an expert system, which has a higher success rate of suggesting 
a treatment than the doctor him/herself. As a result, less time is 
allocated for decision making of the human, which discourages 
their disagreement with the expert systems, while in legal terms 
full responsibility and accountability are assigned to the doctor.
Chang-Yun Ku addressed this problem in a thought experi-
ment of a conflict between a doctor’s diagnosis and an AI rec-
ommendation: AI suggests a treatment and the doctor believes 
it is not necessary. Assuming that this fictional doctor would in 
this case be very likely to advocate the treatment, Ku pointed 
out a tension with Article 22 (1) of the General Data Protection 
Regulation, which requires that decisions, which will have sig-
nificant impact on a person, should not be made solely by au-
tomated systems. Legally speaking, the decision is made by the 
doctor, but it can be argued whether he/she had enough auton-
omy in these circumstances.
Mark Coeckelbergh touched on similar problems, offering 
some insights into the ideas currently guiding European pol-
icy makers. Central to European policy is to ensure that hu-
mans make the decisions. Besides the philosophical problems 
of assigning responsibility to machines with their non-existent 
agency, he also referred to the “many hands problem”, which 
makes it difficult to trace exactly who is responsible for the de-
cision of a machine. In order for the human decision to be au-
tonomous and at the same time, to include the recommenda-
tions by expert system, the human has to be able to understand 
its “reasoning”. Efforts in the area of Explainable AI must be 
directed to enabling the decision maker, e. g. a doctor, to acquire 
enough information about the expert system to explain its result. 
Furthermore, the regulations on the use of AI technology must 
leave enough time for reflection on the results of the expert sys-
tem. Otherwise, a decision will likely be replaced by a post-hoc 
rationalization.
Many participants were critical of the idea that a human will 
always be legally responsible for decisions in these contexts. Go-
ing forward, there seem to be three different options: 1) accept 
the situation and act as described above; 2) find ways to distrib-
ute legal responsibility to the expert system; 3) reach a societal 
consensus that expert systems should not be used in some ar-
eas. The discussion did not result in a clear preference between 
these options.
The general leitmotif of this interdisciplinary workshop may 
be summarized as follows: what is human (knowledge, agency, 
responsibility) and what is not in the process of digitization. 
This theoretical question, however, is intertwined with a prac-
tical one (in a Kantian sense): what may we, a human society, 
hope to be? For achieving concrete results of TA, it seems that 
these questions need to be considered together.
How to distribute accountability and responsibility  
 of human actors making decisions based on the suggestion  
 of an automated expert system?
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